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Knowledge, Belief, Normality, and Introspection
Abstract
We study two logics of knowledge and belief stemming from the work of
Robert Stalnaker [18], omitting positive introspection for knowledge. The
two systems are equivalent with positive introspection, but not without.
We show that while the logic of beliefs remains unaffected by omitting
introspection for knowledge in one system, it brings significant changes
to the other. The resulting logic of belief is non-normal, and its com-
plete axiomatization uses an infinite hierarchy of coherence constraints.
We conclude by returning to the philosophical interpretation underlying
both models of belief, showing that neither is strong enough to support a
probabilistic interpretation, nor an interpretation in terms of certainty or
the “mental component” of knowledge.
The1 starting point of this paper is the logic of knowledge and belief proposed
by Robert Stalnaker in [18], and recently studied further in [1, 15]. In this
system the only purely doxastic axiom is D. All other core principles for the
logic of belief—K, 4, and 5— are theorems instead of axioms. They follow
from a number of principles regimenting the interaction between knowledge and
belief (see Table 2) together with the axioms for knowledge. Belief, furthermore,
becomes definable in terms of the knowledge modality in that logic. An agent
believes ϕ if and only if it is consistent with that agent’s information that she
knows ϕ.
In this paper we study the logic of belief that results from omitting pos-
itive introspection for knowledge in Stalnaker’s system. While he explicitly
rejects negative introspection, Stalnaker “provisionally” accepts that knowing
implies knowing that one knows [18, p.173]. This principle, however, has been
the subject of much discussion, starting with Hintikka’s [10]. See [9] for an
overview of the classical points of contention. In recent years Williamson’s [21,
chap.5] charge against the so-called “KK-principle” has attracted much atten-
tion. Williamson argues that if knowledge comes with a margin of error then
assuming positive introspection leads to paradoxes. We do not take sides in this
debate here. Rather, we investigate the logical question of what happens to the
logic of belief in Stalnaker’s system when knowledge is not introspective.
This paper is thus primarily aimed at epistemic logicians. It helps chart the
landscape of combined epistemic and doxastic systems when knowledge is not
positively introspective, viz. when the epistemic logic does not contain the 4
axiom. This complements Wolgang Lenzen’s early work on epistemic-doxastic
logics, in which knowledge is between S4 and S5 [14]. We offer a number of
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K ` K(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Kϕ→ Kψ)
NEC If ` ϕ then ` Kϕ
4 ` Kϕ→ KKϕ
T ` Kϕ→ ϕ
Table 1: S4 for knowledge
D ` Bϕ→ 〈B〉ϕ
KB ` Kϕ→ Bϕ
PI ` Bϕ→ KBϕ
NI ` ¬Bϕ→ K¬Bϕ
SB ` Bϕ→ BKϕ
Table 2: Stalnaker’s axioms for the interaction between knowledge and belief
new completeness results together with a discussion of the interpretation of the
resulting belief operators.
Section 1 presents Stalnaker’s original system and some of its salient prop-
erties. It turns out that omitting positive introspection from that system gives
rise to two rather different logics of beliefs. We present one at the end of Sec-
tion 1, while the other is covered in Section 2. In Section 3 we ask whether
this resulting belief operator can be supported by a probabilistic interpretation,
and answer in the negative. Section 4 concludes by casting doubt on whether
this belief operator can instead be read as “subjective certainty” or the “mental
component” of knowledge.
1 Stalnaker’s original system
In this section we review Stalnaker’s original proposal. The presentation con-
solidates a number of known [1, 15, 18] and new results about that system. In
the Appendix of this paper we also provide a cut-free display calculus for it.
1.1 Basic properties and axiomatization of the belief frag-
ment
Throughout this paper we work with a propositional modal language augmented
with one epistemic (K) and one doxastic (B) modality. Let Prop be a countable
set of atomic propositions. The language L is defined as follows.
ϕ := p ∈ Prop | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Kϕ | Bϕ
Kϕ and Bϕ are read respectively as “the agent knows that ϕ” and “the agent
believes that ϕ”. We write 〈K〉 and 〈B〉 for the corresponding duals.
In Stalnaker’s system, knowledge is taken to be normal, in the technical
sense [3], factive, and positively introspective. It is an S4 modality (Table 1).
Belief, on the other hand, is characterized through its relation with knowledge.
This relation is encapsulated by the axioms in Table 2.
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D is the only purely doxastic principle in this list. It rules out inconsistent
pairs of beliefs. KB is the rather widespread assumption that knowledge implies
belief. Unlike knowledge, PI and NI make belief fully transparent. The basic
underlying idea here is that knowledge presupposes truth, a property to which
the agent does not have direct access. Belief, on the other hand, is a mental
state to which we have privileged and immediate access. So, the axiom goes, not
only do agents have beliefs about their beliefs or lack thereof, they also know
these facts about themselves. In other words, the agent is never uncertain nor
mistaken in regard to what she believes.
Probably the most controversial axiom of this system is SB, standing for
Strong Belief. It states that believing implies believing that one knows. One
interpretation of this is that we are dealing with a form of belief that is close
to absolute subjective certainty [1, 15], or, that is, the “mental component”
of knowledge. This is certainly not the common-or-garden concept of belief,
although here we side with Lenzen [14] in the view that might be called doxastic
pluralism: that there is not one but many different concepts of belief, each to
be captured by a different logical system. On this view the belief operator in
Stalnaker’s system is a very strong variety of belief. Logically speaking, it is in
fact close to what Lenzen calls “being convinced of” (überzeugt sein) [14]. Hence
the thought arises that one could interpret that operator, and thereby the axiom
SB, by using the notions of absolute certainty or even the mental component of
knowledge. The relation between knowledge and belief in this system turns out
to be subtle, though, especially when knowledge is not positively introspective.
So, for now, we leave the discussion of the interpretation of the belief operator
under the Stalnaker axioms at that. We shall return to it in Sections 3 and 4.
Write S for the logic consisting of axioms and rule of Table 1 and 2, together
with all propositional tautologies. Call the belief fragment LB of L the set of
all formulas in L that do not contain the K modality. The belief fragment of
the logic S is defined as S ∩ LB .
Observation 1. (cf. [18]) For all ϕ ∈ LB:
If KD45 ` ϕ then S ` ϕ.
This result does not need positive introspection for knowledge. This will be
seen to be important later. We sketch the proof here.
Proof of Observation 1. We show how to derive D, 4 and 5 for the belief oper-
ator, i.e. the formulas Bϕ → 〈B〉ϕ (D), Bϕ → BBϕ (4) and ¬Bϕ → B¬Bϕ
(5). D is an axiom, and 4 and 5 follow directly from PI and NI, together with
KB. Indeed, for 4, starting from Bϕ one gets KBϕ by one application of PI,
and then BBϕ follows from KB. The argument for 5 is completely analogous.
The proof of normality of B in that logic, i.e. that it admits the K axiom
and the necessitation rule, is facilitated by what is probably the most crucial
theorem of that logic:
Bϕ↔ 〈K〉Kϕ (EQ)
Observation 2. (cf. [18]) S ` EQ
In this logic, believing is equivalent to the epistemic possibility of knowledge,
i.e. one believes ϕ exactly when one’s current knowledge is consistent with
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knowing ϕ. The derivation of (EQ) notably does not involve positive introspec-
tion for knowledge. Again, this will be important later, so again we sketch the
proof here.
Proof of Observation 2. Assuming that Bϕ holds, we start by invoking SB to
get BKϕ. From there, we arrive at 〈B〉Kϕ and finally at 〈K〉Kϕ using D and
KB, in that order. For the other direction, we start by assuming 〈K〉Kϕ. We
can derive 〈K〉Bϕ using KB and the fact that K is a normal modality. One
application of NI then gives us Bϕ.
With this in hand we can return to the argument for the normality of B.
For NEC, assuming that ϕ is a theorem, NEC for K gives us that Kϕ is also a
theorem. From there, one application of the T axiom for K and modus ponens
entails that 〈K〉Kϕ, and hence that Bϕ is a theorem too. Now, it is well known
that in the presence of NEC the K axiom is provably equivalent to distribution
over conjunction:
B(ϕ ∧ ψ)↔ Bϕ ∧Bψ (Dist-∧)
The left-to-right implication follows straightforwardly from the fact that K is
normal. The right-to-left direction is also well known and was already noted by
Stalnaker. Here, however, we present a proof of it that is, to our knowledge,
new and, more importantly, that does not make use of positive introspection for
knowledge.
Observation 3. S ` Bϕ ∧Bψ → B(ϕ ∧ ψ)
Proof. All the steps use normality of K. We first show that:
Bϕ ∧Bψ → B (Bϕ ∧Bψ) (1)
1. 〈K〉Kϕ ∧ 〈K〉Kψ Assumption
2. 〈K〉K〈K〉Kϕ ∧ 〈K〉K〈K〉Kψ From 1. by 4 for B.
3. 〈K〉KK〈K〉Kϕ ∧ 〈K〉KK〈K〉Kψ From 2. by SB.
4. K〈K〉K〈K〉Kϕ ∧K〈K〉K〈K〉Kψ From 3. by D for B
5. 〈K〉K(〈K〉K〈K〉Kϕ ∧ 〈K〉K〈K〉Kψ) From 4. by Norm. of K + T
6. 〈K〉K(K〈K〉〈K〉Kϕ ∧K〈K〉〈K〉Kψ) From 5. by D for B
7. 〈K〉K(K〈K〉Kϕ ∧K〈K〉Kψ) From 6. by SB
8. 〈K〉K(〈K〉Kϕ ∧ 〈K〉Kψ) From 7. by T
And then we show that:
B (Bϕ ∧Bψ)→ B(ϕ ∧ ψ). (2)
1. 〈K〉K(〈K〉Kϕ ∧ 〈K〉Kψ) Assumption
2. 〈K〉K(〈K〉KKϕ ∧ 〈K〉KKψ) From 1 by SB
3. 〈K〉K(K〈K〉Kϕ ∧ 〈K〉KKψ) From 2 by D.
4. 〈K〉K〈K〉(〈K〉Kϕ ∧KKψ) From 3 by Normality of K
5. 〈K〉K〈K〉〈K〉(Kϕ ∧Kψ) From 4 by Normality of K
6. 〈K〉K〈K〉〈K〉K(ϕ ∧ ψ) From 5 by Normality of K
7. K〈K〉〈K〉〈K〉K(ϕ ∧ ψ) From 6 by D
8. K〈K〉K(ϕ ∧ ψ) From 7 by SB twice
9. 〈K〉K(ϕ ∧ ψ) From 8 by T
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This finishes the proof of Observation 1. Again, the notable feature of this
proof is that it nowhere uses positive introspection for knowledge. So, even if
knowledge is not introspective, which in Stalnaker’s system boils down for it to
be a KT modality, the logic of belief in S is still at least KD45. Again, this will
be important later. For now, however, we can show more, namely that the logic
of belief in Stalnaker’s system is exactly KD45.
Observation 4. For all ϕ ∈ LB:
S ` ϕ if and only if KD45 ` ϕ
Proof. The right-to-left direction is Observation 1. For the left-to-right direc-
tion, assume that KD45 6` ϕ. We have to show that S 6` ϕ. Since KD45 6` ϕ,
there is a maximally KD45-consistent set Γ ⊆ LB with ¬ϕ ∈ Γ. We shall
show that Γ is in fact already a S-consistent set. To this end, define Kψ as
Bψ ∧ ψ. We have to show that Γ together with this newly defined K operator
is S consistent, i.e. that it is S4 and satisfies the interaction axioms of Table 2.
Normality of K follows from normality of B. The T axiom for K as well as
Stalnaker’s KB follow immediately from the definition of K. Further, note that
Bψ implies BBψ by KD45 for B and these two together imply B(Bψ ∧ ψ),
using normality once again. But this exactly means that Bψ → BKψ, which
is the SB axiom. Further, by the same derivation, we find that Bψ ∧ψ implies
B(Bψ ∧ ψ) ∧ Bψ ∧ ψ. But this means exactly that Kψ → KKψ, i.e. the
4-axiom. Further, using positive introspection, we obtain Bψ → BBψ ∧ Bψ.
The consequent is by definition equivalent to KBψ, thus proving PI. Finally,
using 5 for B, we find that ¬Bψ → B¬Bψ ∧ ¬Bψ. Again the consequent is
by definition equivalent to K¬Bψ, proving NI. Thus, Γ is also a maximally
S-consistent set. Since ¬ϕ ∈ S, this implies that S 6` ϕ.
Furthermore, three more minor facts are worth noting regarding Stalnaker’s
system. First, PI is redundant in that system. Write S−PI for Stalnaker’s
system minus PI.
Observation 5. For all formulas ϕ ∈ L,
S ` ϕ if and only if S−PI ` ϕ
Proof. We have to show that S−PI ` PI. First, we note that the proof of
S ` (EQ) did not rely on PI. Thus, S−PI ` EQ. Having this, we can show PI.
From Bϕ, that is from 〈K〉Kϕ by (EQ), one application of SB gives 〈K〉KKϕ,
and one application of D gives K〈K〉Kϕ, which is just KBϕ.
Furthermore, it should be clear that Stalnaker’s system is not a conservative
extension of S4 for the knowledge modality. A simple illustration of that is that
in the presence of (EQ), D for belief translates into the .2 axiom for knowledge,
〈K〉Kϕ→ K〈K〉ϕ
which is of course not a theorem of S4 alone.
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On the other hand, if we augment S4 with .2 and the equivalence (EQ), then
we retrieve Stalnaker’s system S. More precisely: Define S4.2 +EQ as the logic
S4.2 for knowledge augmented with (EQ), here taken as an axiom. Observe that
the latter is the only principle for belief in this logic.
Observation 6. (cf. [15]) For all formulas ϕ:
S ` ϕ if and only if S4.2 + EQ ` ϕ
Again, the proof of this result will be important later, this time because it
does make use of positive introspection for knowledge.
Proof. We have already shown that S4.2 +EQ ⊆ S, since the latter contains S4
and derives (EQ), from which we obtain .2 for K. For the converse, it suffices to
show that the axioms of Table 2 are theorems of S4.2+EQ. Again, with (EQ), D
is just .2 under another guise, and KB is a direct consequence of T for knowledge.
SB is derived by one application of 4 to 〈K〉Kϕ. As shown above, PI follows from
that by one application of .2. We get NI in contrapositive by one application of
4 to 〈K〉〈K〉Kϕ.
The proof of Observation 4 might seem to suggest that, in Stalnaker’s system,
knowledge is the same as true belief. This does not hold true in general.
Observation 7.
S 6` Kϕ↔ ϕ ∧Bϕ
Proof. The left-to-right implication always holds, as it follows from KB and the
T axiom. We show that the reverse direction does not hold in general by means
of a counterexample. Figure 1 displays a model for a S4.2 knowledge relation,
i.e. the relation is reflexive, transitive and satisfies the Church-Rosser property.
By defining Bϕ as 〈K〉Kϕ, this model becomes a S-model (cf. Observation 6),
i.e. a model of Stalnaker’s original axioms as shown in tables 1 and 2 in which
ϕ ∧Bϕ→ Kϕ is not valid. In that model M,w3  Kp. Hence M,w1  〈K〉Kp






Figure 1: An KT.2 model in which Kp ↔ p ∧ Bp fails, when B is defined
through (EQ).
Let us take stock. We have now two ways to build a logic of belief on top of S4
for knowledge. The first is by Stalnaker’s axioms in Table 2, and the resulting
logic is S. The second is by adding .2 for knowledge and (EQ), to get S4.2+EQ.
The two are provably equivalent, see Observation 6. So we are in fact dealing
with one logical system, whose belief fragment we otherwise know to be exactly
KD45.
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1.2 Stalnaker’s axioms with non-introspective knowledge
Let us now go back to the main question of this paper: to pinpoint the conse-
quences, for the logic of belief, of omitting 4 for knowledge. Let us formulate
this more precisely. Let S−4 be exactly as S except that the logic of knowledge
is KT instead of S4. Define KT.2+EQ analogously. The question we are asking,
then, is what is the logic of belief in S−4 and KT.2+EQ?
The answer for S−4 is already at hand. The proof of Observation 1 shows
that K, NEC, 4 and 5 for B are all still derivable in S−4, and so is (EQ). This
means:
Observation 8. For all ϕ ∈ LB:
S−4 ` ϕ if and only if KD45 ` ϕ
Proof. We have just argued that KD45 ` ϕ implies S−4 ` ϕ. Since S−4 is a
fragment of S, this implies in turn S ` ϕ. But we know by Observation 4 that
the latter happens if and only if KD45 ` ϕ.
So we already know the answer to our first question, namely what happens
to the logic of belief when we omit positive introspection for knowledge in Stal-
naker’s system? To put it bluntly, the answer is: nothing. Omitting positive
introspection for knowledge in Stalnaker’s leaves the logic of belief intact. Of
course, this is not the case for knowledge. S−4 is a non-conservative extension
of KT, and Kϕ→ KKϕ is not valid in that system. This can be illustrated by







So while omitting 4 from S yields a genuinely different logic of knowledge, this
does not affect the belief fragment. Is that also the case for KT.2+EQ? That
4 is used three times in the proof of Observation 6 suggests that the answer is
no. This is indeed the case, as we show in the next section.
2 KT.2 and belief as epistemic possibility of knowl-
edge
In this section we will turn to the logic of belief when it is defined as the epistemic
possibility of knowledge, as in (EQ). We start with an epistemic logic where K
is a KT.2 modality. The only axiom for the belief modality is (EQ). In other
words, all and only the logical properties of belief are those inherited from its
reduction to 〈K〉K. The question we ask can be then reformulated as follows:
what is the sound and complete logic of the 〈K〉K fragment of KT.2?
We have seen in the previous section that if knowledge is S4.2 then this logic
of belief is equivalent to the one resulting from Stalnaker’s axiom, and that
it is completely axiomatized by KD45. This equivalence fails if the logic of
knowledge is weakened to KT.2. This is what we show first, by arguing that
7
the resulting logic of belief is not normal. For this we will use semantic tools,
which we introduce in Section 2.1. We then move to a complete axiomatization
of the logic of belief, in Section 2.2.
2.1 Kripke, Neighborhoods, and MUD
Knowledge is interpreted in standard Kripke frames where the epistemic acces-
sibility relation is reflexive and satisfies the so-called Church-Rosser property:
Definition 1. An epistemic frame F is a pair 〈W,R〉 where W is a set of
states and R is a reflexive, binary relation satisfying, for all w, x, y ∈W :
• (Church-Rosser) If wRx and wRy then there is a z such that xRz and
yRz.
An epistemic model M is an epistemic frame together with a valuation V
assigning subsets of W to each atomic proposition in Prop.
The truth condition for epistemic formulas thus becomes:
M,w  Kϕ iff If wRv then M, v  ϕ
It is well known that the logic KT.2 is sound and complete with respect to the
class of epistemic frames. Now define Bϕ as 〈K〉Kϕ. This belief operator is
not normal. The right-to-left direction of distribution under conjunction for
beliefs, that is Dist-∧ on page 4, fails. Figure 2 illustrates this with a simple
counter-example. This model displays the epistemic relation R. At w1 we have








Figure 2: A KT.2 model in which the corresponding belief is not closed under
conjunction
This belief operator otherwise validates necessitation and the left-to-right






Observation 9. NEC, REG and D for B are sound with respect to KT.2 models
where B is defined as 〈K〉K.
NEC, REG and D are, however, not complete for the belief fragment. To
show this, we move from Kripke to neighborhood frames.2
2See [16] for some background on neighborhood frames.
8
Definition 2. A MUD neighborhood frame FN , or MUD frame for short,
is a pair 〈W,n〉, where W is a set of possible worlds and n : W → P(P(W )) is
a neighborhood function, satisfying the following conditions:
If X ∈ n(w) and X ⊆ Y then Y ∈ n(w). (Monotonicity)
W ∈ n(w). (contains the Unit)
If X ∈ n(w) then for all Y ∈ n(w), X ∩ Y 6= ∅. GGG (D)
A MUD model M is a neighborhood frame augmented with a valuation function
V , as above.
MUD models are used to interpret the belief operator only. Given a MUD
model M , we write ‖ϕ‖M for the truth set of ϕ in M , that is the set {w : M,w 
ϕ}. The truth condition for B is the standard one for neighborhood structures.
M,w  Bϕ iff ‖ϕ‖ ∈ n(w)
It is again well known that NEC, REG and D are together sound and complete
with respect to the class of MUD frames. This logic, however, is sound but not
complete for the belief fragment of KT.2. Let the formula (NBM), standing for
No Belief in Moore sentence, be defined as follows:
〈B〉(p→ Bp) (NBM)
We will offer some interpretation of (NBM) soon. First, we show that (NBM)




Proof. For proving the first claim, start with the following theorem of KT:Kp→
〈K〉〈K〉Kp. This is equivalent to 〈K〉¬p ∨ 〈K〉〈K〉Kp. K being normal, the
latter is in turn equivalent to 〈K〉(p→ 〈K〉Kp). One application of necessitation
gives us the required formula, using (EQ): K〈K〉(p → 〈K〉Kp). It is easy to
construct a counter-model to the validity of that formula in MUD frames.
We now return to the interpretation of (NBM). This formula is equivalent to
¬B(p ∧ ¬Bp)
and the formula p ∧ ¬Bp in the scope of the outermost belief operator is,
of course, the classical “Moore sentence.” The logic KT.2 thus precludes the
agent from believing such a sentence about herself. This is a second-order
coherence condition on belief in KT.2. Observe, however, that the stronger
conditions of positive and negative introspection both fail for belief in this logic.
Counter-examples are easy to construct. So, even though beliefs are not fully
transparent, they are nonetheless subject to higher-order coherence constraints
such as (NBM). NEC, REG and D, however, capture the full structure of first-
order belief, i.e. a non-embedded belief fragment, as we will show at the end of
the next section. These axioms and rules are sound and complete for the class
of LB formulas of modal depth at most one. But the full belief fragment is more
demanding, as we shall see presently.
9
2.2 Beyond MUD: completeness
The formula (NBM) does not yet suffice to completely characterize the belief
fragment of KT. 2 + EQ. We need to strengthen this condition to interact with
other beliefs held by the agent. This strengthening turns out to be a set of non-
trivial, infinitary constraints that lives at the frontier of expressive power for
our language. So before we give a precise definition we present some intuitions
guiding the construction.
The condition we need is encapsulated syntactically by the following sequence
of formulas using infinite conjunction over LB . We will show this in Lemma 2
below.
B0ψ := Bψ
Bn+1ψ := Bnψ ∧
∧
ϕ∈LB
〈B〉 (ϕ→ ψ ∧Bnϕ) .
Note that B1> = B>∧
∧
ϕ∈LB 〈B〉(ϕ→ Bϕ). The first conjunct is a theorem of
KT. 2 + EQ. The second conjunct is exactly the condition expressed by taking
all instances of (NBM). Since B1ψ → B1>, the B1ψ are thus a stronger version
of the “no Moore sentence” condition.
B1ψ can best be interpreted in terms of a stability condition. While the usual
ϕ ∧ ¬Bϕ states that ϕ is true, yet the agent does not believe it, the condition
ϕ ∧ ¬ (ψ ∧Bϕ) states that ϕ is true, yet whenever ψ holds, the agent does not
believe that ϕ. This condition thus relativizes the classical Moore sentence to
those cases where ψ is true. With this in mind, B1ψ can be read as stating that
the agent believes ψ and even if we deleted all ¬ψ worlds, the agent would still
not believe any Moore sentence about herself. In other words, the agent’s belief
in ψ is fully compatible with her believing a no-Moore condition.
The formulas Biψ then are higher-order equivalents of this ψ no-Moore con-
dition. In fact, the formulas Bnψ form an increasing hierarchy of conditions;
that is, we have Bnψ → Bn−1ψ for all n. As it will turn out, the Bi> are central
for characterizing the belief fragment of KT.2 + EQ. We will see below that
validity of the Bi> is necessary and sufficient for representing any MUD-models
as KT.2 Kripke models (Lemma 2). We thus define:
Definition 3. A MUD∞ model is an MUD neighborhood model in which all
Bi> for i ∈ ω are valid.
Fortunately, though, in order to completely axiomatize the belief fragment of
KT. 2 + EQ we do not need to write down all the Bi> explicitly. We can work
with finite approximations. This is what we show now.
To begin with, let us define sets of sets of LB formulas Xψi for i ≥ 1 and
ψ ∈ L. The construction is by induction over i. For the base case i = 1 and
ψ ∈ LB , let
X
ψ
1 = {Bψ ∧ 〈B〉 (ϕ→ ψ ∧Bϕ) | ϕ ∈ LB}.
We then define Xψ1 as the set of all finite conjunctions of formulas from X
ψ
1 .
Similarly, for i > 1, we define
X
ψ
i = {ρ ∧ 〈B〉 (ϕ→ ψ ∧ χ) | ϕ ∈ LB , ρ ∈ X
ψ




with again letting Xψi be the set of finite conjunctions of X
ψ
i . So the X
ψ
i are
finitary approximations of Biψ and we thus have Biψ  χ for any χ ∈ Xψi .
A central role in our axiomatization is played by the X>i . In fact, it is
sufficient to look at these X>i , i.e. the finitary counterparts of the formulas of the
form Bi>, which are in turn the classical, non-relativized no-Moore condition
and their higher order variant. These Bi> are all sound with respect to the
belief fragment of KT. 2 + EQ, and so are the X>i . In fact, within KT. 2 + EQ,
the entire hierarchy of Xψi is situated between knowledge and belief. This is
in fact true for infinitary formulas Biϕ as well. However, showing this would
require us to enter the proof theory of infinitary languages in more detail. So
we leave this aside for now.




Proof. The only thing to be shown is the first implication. We prove this by
induction over i. We start with i = 1. Assume Kψ. We thus have to derive any
formula χ in Xψ1 . Without loss of generality, it suffices to limit our attention to
χ ∈ Xψ1 . By (EQ), we thus have to show, for an arbitrary ϕ ∈ LB , that
Bψ ∧K〈K〉 (ϕ→ ψ ∧Bϕ)
First, we note that the first conjunct holds. Indeed, applying the T axiom,
we have Kψ → 〈K〉Kψ, i.e. Kψ → Bψ, taking care of the first conjunct. It
thus remains to show that Kψ implies the second conjunct. We show the con-
trapositive. Assume that ¬K〈K〉 (ϕ→ ψ ∧Bϕ), i.e. 〈K〉K (ϕ ∧ (¬ψ ∨ ¬Bϕ)).
Using T and the normality of K, this implies that 〈K〉 (Kϕ ∧ (¬ψ ∨ ¬Bϕ)),
which is equivalent to 〈K〉(Kϕ ∧ ¬ψ) ∨ 〈K〉(Kϕ ∧ ¬Bϕ). The second disjunct,
〈K〉(Kϕ∧¬Bϕ), is inconsistent with Kϕ→ Bϕ, which we have derived above.
Thus the first disjunct 〈K〉(Kϕ ∧ ¬ψ) is true. But this implies 〈K〉¬ψ, and
hence ¬Kψ. This contradicts our induction assumption of Kψ, thus deriving
the desired contradiction. The proof of the induction step from i to i + 1 is
similar to the above proof, with all Bψ replaced by χ ∈ Xψi and Bϕ replaced
by χ′ ∈ Xϕi .
Corollary 1. `KT.2+EQ χ for all χ ∈ X>i and i ∈ ω.
The axiom and rules D, NEC and REG as well as all elements of X>i for
all i are thus sound with respect to the belief fragment of KT. 2 + EQ. In the
following, we will denote this infinite set of axioms by MUD +X. Is MUD +X
also complete with respect to the belief fragment of KT. 2 + EQ? Yes.
Theorem 1. The system MUD +X is a sound and complete axiomatization for
the belief part of KT. 2 + EQ
In order to show completeness, we will need two auxiliary results. The first one
shows that counter-models in MUD∞ frames can be constructed for each non-
theorem of MUD +X. The second is the key representation theorem, showing
that any MUD∞-model can be turned into a KT.2 model. These two together
give us completeness.
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Lemma 1. Let ϕ such that 6`MUD+X ϕ. Then there is a MUD∞ model in which
M 6 ϕ
Proof. We start with constructing a canonical modelM = 〈W,n, V 〉 of MUD +X.
As usual, the set of worlds W of M is the set of all maximally MUD +X consis-
tent subsets of LB . First, we note that W is not empty, as MUD +X is sound
with respect to the class of all KT.2 models, as shown in Corollary 1. Define
the neighborhood function of M as n(w) = {{v|ϕ ∈ v}|Bϕ ∈ w} and close
all neighborhoods under supersets. As usual, the atomic valuation is given by
w ∈ V (p) iff p ∈ w. We have to show that
M,w  ϕ iff ϕ ∈ w
We do so by induction over the complexity of ϕ. The atomic and Boolean case
work as usual. We only show the case where ϕ is of the form Bψ. For the
right-to-left direction, assume that ϕ = Bψ ∈ w. By construction, {v|ψ ∈
v} ∈ n(w). By induction hypothesis, we have that {v|ψ ∈ v} = {v|M,v  ψ},
thus also the latter is in n(w). Therefore M,w  Bψ, which completes the
proof. For the reverse direction, assume that ϕ = Bψ 6∈ w. Again, by induction
hypothesis it suffices to show that {v|M, v  ψ} 6∈ n(w). We thus need to
show for all Y ∈ n(w) that there is some y ∈ Y with M,y  ¬ψ. Let an
arbitrary Y ∈ n(w) be given. By construction of the n(w), there is some
Bχ ∈ w with Y ⊇ {v|χ ∈ v}. First, we show that 6`MUD+X χ → ψ: If
not, `MUD+X χ→ ψ holds, which together with Bχ ∈ w and REG implies that
Bψ ∈ w, contradicting the assumption that Bψ 6∈ w. Thus 6`MUD+X χ → ψ,
and hence there is some maximally MUD +X consistent set y with χ ∈ y and
ψ 6∈ y. In particular y ∈ Y , but, by induction hypothesis, M,y 6 ψ, finishing
the proof that {v|M,v  ψ} 6∈ n(w).
Now we proceed by showing that M is not just a MUD +X, but also a
MUD∞-model, i.e. that all Bi> are valid on M . By construction, all X>i are
valid on M . We show by induction on i that M,w  Biψ iff M,w  Xψi for all
ψ ∈ LB . The left to right direction is automatic. For the right to left direction
the basic case, i = 1, is also straightforward. So assume now that M,w  Xψi







. By construction of Xψi we have that
M,w  Xψi implies M,w  ρ for all ρ ∈ X
ψ
i−1. By our induction assumption we




holds automatically whenever Bϕ 6∈ w. Thus, it suffices to show that this
formula also holds for all ϕ ∈ LB with Bϕ ∈ w. Let such ϕ be given. By
assumption, we have for all ρ ∈ Xϕi−1 that M,w  〈B〉 (ϕ→ ψ ∧ ρ).
So for every ρ ∈ Xϕi−1, there is a maximally consistent set v with ϕ,ψ, ρ ∈ v.
In particular, since Xϕi−1 is closed under finite conjunctions we have that for
all ρ1, . . . ρn ∈ Xϕi−1 there is a v ∈ W with ϕ,ψ ∈ v and ρ1, . . . ρn ∈ v. But
this is just to say that every finite subset ϕ,ψ, ρ1, . . . , ρn of {ϕ,ψ} ∪ Xϕi−1 is
MUD +X-consistent. Since `MUD+X is compact, this implies that {ϕ,ψ}∪Xϕi−1
is consistent as well. So there must be a world v ∈W with M, v  ϕ∧ψ∧Xϕi−1.
By induction assumption, this implies that M,v  ϕ∧ψ∧Bi−1ϕ as desired and




, finishing the proof of ii).
Lemma 2. Let M be a MUD model.
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1. Let d ∈ ω: If B2d> is valid in M , then for each w ∈ M , there is a KT.2
model N, v such that M,w and N, v agree on all belief formulas up to
modal depth d.
2. If all Bi> are valid in M , then for each w ∈ M , there is a KT.2 model
N, v such that M,w and N, v satisfy the same formulas in LB, i.e. they
are modally equivalent for the belief fragment.
Proof. Let M = 〈WM , n, V 〉 be a MUD model. We start by inductively defining
a sequence of neighborhood functions ni : WM → PP(WM ). Let n̄(w) denote
the upward closure of {‖ϕ‖ | ‖ϕ‖ ∈ n(w) for some ϕ}. Note that n̄(w) ⊆ n(w).
We define:
n0(w) :=n(w)
ni+1(w) :={X ∈ ni(w)|∀Y ∈ n̄(w) ∃r ∈ X ∩ Y : Y ∈ ni(r)}
Since the n(w) are upward closed, the ni(w) are as well. Also, since ni(w) ⊆
n(w), X ∩ Y 6= ∅ for all X,Y ∈ ni(w) (since the same holds true for n(w)).
Furthermore we show that the neighborhoods ni interpret the operators Bi in
the following sense: For all v ∈WM and all ϕ ∈ LB holds that
M,v  Biϕ iff ‖ϕ‖ ∈ ni(v)
We show this by an induction over i. For i = 0, the claim is obviously true.
Now assume the claim holds for i− 1, we show that it holds for i. First, assume
that Biϕ holds at v. We have to show that ‖ϕ‖ ∈ ni(v). By definition of
n̄(v), it suffices to show for all ψ ∈ LB with ‖ψ‖ ∈ n(v) that there is some x ∈
‖ϕ‖ ∩ ‖ψ‖ with ‖ψ‖ ∈ ni−1(x). By definition, our assumption Biϕ implies that∧
ψ ∈LB 〈B〉(ψ → ϕ∧B
i−1ψ). Thus, whenever ‖ψ‖ ∈ n(v), there is some x ∈ ‖ψ‖
with M,x  ϕ∧Bi−1ψ. In particular, x ∈ ‖ψ‖∩‖ϕ‖ and by induction hypothesis
also ‖ψ‖ ∈ ni−1(x), since M,w  Bi−1ψ. This finishes the proof of the first
direction. For the reverse direction, assume that ‖ϕ‖ ∈ ni(v). We have to show
that M, v  Bi−1ϕ ∧
∧
ψ ∈LB 〈B〉(ψ → ϕ ∧ B
i−1ψ). First, since the ni(v) ⊆
ni−1(v), we have that ‖ϕ‖ ∈ ni−1(v) and thus by induction M,w  Bi−1ϕ.
Now let ψ ∈ LB . Since the n(w) interpreting B are upward closed, it suffices to
show that X := ‖ψ ∧ ¬(ϕ ∧ Bi−1ψ)‖ 6∈ n(v). Assume for a contradiction that
X ∈ n(v). Thus X ∈ n̄(v) and, since ‖ϕ‖ ∈ ni(v), there is some x ∈ ‖ϕ‖ ∩X
with X ∈ ni−1(x). Since ‖ψ‖ ⊇ X, this implies that ‖ψ‖ ∈ ni−1(x). But by
induction, this implies that M,x  ϕ ∧ Bi−1ψ, contradicting the assumption
that x ∈ X.
Now we can start proving 1). Assume, thatB2d> is valid inM (i.e. M, v  B2d>
for all v ∈ WM ). Since B2d> → Bi> for all i ≤ 2d, we have that all neigh-
borhoods ni(v) for v ∈ WM and i ≤ 2d are non-empty. We now construct
an epistemic model N, v. We start by constructing the set of worlds WN of
N . The set WN will be divided into different layers, L0, . . . , L2d+1, which are
constructed inductively. This construction is pictured in Figure 3.
Each world v ∈ Li will be indexed with a pair {x,X} with x ∈ WM and
X ⊆ WM such that X ∈ n2d−i(x). The inductive construction of the Li is as
follows: For the first layer, L0, pick any X ∈ n2d(w). Layer L0, then contains
a single world vw,X . Now, assume that Li−1 is already constructed for some
13






















Figure 3: The construction of N as a layered model (all reflexive arrows missing)
i < 2d. To construct Li, we execute the following steps for each vx,X in Li−1.
By assumption, X ∈ n2d−(i−1)(x). Thus, we have that for every Y ∈ n̄(x), there
is r ∈ X∩Y with Y ∈ n2d−i(r). For every Y ∈ n̄(x) pick such r and add a world
vr,Y to Li. Further, add a world vy,WM for all y ∈ X to Li. This concludes the
inductive construction up to L2d. Finally, the last layer L2d+1 again contains a
single world labeled vw,WM . Now, we define a valuation V
N and an accessibility
relation R on the set of worlds L0 ∪ . . . ∪ L2d+1, turning it into a KT.2 model.
The valuation V N is given by vx,X ∈ V N (p) iff x ∈ V (p). As for the accessibility
relation, we connect every vx,X in Li to itself and to every vy,Y in Li+1 with
y ∈ X. We also connect every world in L2d to the unique element of L2d+1.
Finally, the unique element of L0 will be the designated world v.
It remains to show that N, v is indeed an epistemic model and that M,w 
ϕ ⇔ N, v  ϕ for all ϕ of modal depth at most d. We start by showing that
N, v is an epistemic model. The relation R is reflexive by construction. For
the Church-Rosser property: Let vx,X ∈ Li and vx,XRvy,Y , vx,XRvz,Z . Wlog,
vy,Y , vz,Z ∈ Li+1. By construction, Y,Z ∈ n(x) and thus Y ∩ Z 6= ∅, since M
satisfies D. Thus, there is some r ∈ Y ∩Z. By construction, vr,WM ∈ Li+2 with
vy,YRvr,WM and vz,ZRvr,WM .
Next, we show for every vx,X in Li and all ϕ of modal depth at most
d−i
2 that
N, vx,X  ϕ iff M,x  ϕ. We show this by induction over the modal depth of
ϕ. For atomic formulas, this holds true by the definition of the valuation V N .
We only give the proof for ϕ of the form Bψ. We start with the right to left
direction. Assume, that M,x  ϕ. Thus, by definition, Y = ‖ψ‖M ∈ n(x). By
construction of N , there is some y ∈ Y and some vy,Y in Li+1 with vx,XRvy,Y .
Again by construction, all worlds vz,Z accessible from vy,Y satisfy z ∈ Y and are
all in Li+1 and Li+2. Thus, by the induction hypothesis, all these vz,Z satisfy
N, vz,Z  ψ. Thus, N, vy,Y  Kψ and therefore N, vx,X  〈K〉Kψ(= Bψ),
as desired. For the reverse direction, assume that N, vx,X  Bψ. Since Bψ ↔
〈K〉Kψ, there is some vy,Y with vx,XRvy,Y and for all vz,Z with vy,YRvz,Z holds
N, vz,Z  ψ. By the induction hypothesis and the fact that all vz,Z accessible
from vy,Y are in Li+1 or Li+2, we again have M, z  ψ for all these vz,Z . By
construction of the Li, we have Y = {z|∃vz,Z : vy,YRvz,Z} ∈ n(x). Thus, using
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the fact that n(x) is upwards closed, we have that ‖ψ‖M ∈ n(x), completing
the proof.
The proof of 2) is similar to the proof of 1). We only sketch the argument.
This time, the set of worlds of N consists of an infinite hierarchy of layers
L0, L1, . . .. The individual worlds v ∈ WN will be labeled with triples vx,X,n,
where x ∈WM , X ∈ n(x) and n ∈ ω. To construct layer L0, we pick some X ∈⋂
ni(w) (which is non-empty, as WM ∈ ni(w) for all i) and set L0 = {vw,X,0}.
Second, to construct L1, for every Y ∈ n̄(w) and every j ∈ ω pick some r ∈ X
with Y ∈ nj(r). Add a new world to L1 with label xv,Y,j . Further add vr,WM ,j
for every r ∈ X and j ∈ ω to L1. From there on, the inductive procedure goes
as usual: For i > 0 assume that Li is already constructed. For every vx,X,j ∈ Li
with j > 1 and every Y ∈ n̄(x) pick some y ∈ X ∩ Y with Y ∈ nj−1(y) and
add vy,Y,j−1 to Li+1. Also add vx,WM ,l for all x ∈ X and l ∈ ω to Li+1. The
valuation V N is defined as above. The relation R is defined as follows: Relate
every x ∈ WN to itself and relate the unique element of L0 to all elements of
L1. For i > 0, relate vx,X,j ∈ Li with j > 0 to all vy,Y,j−1 ∈ Li+1 with y ∈ X.
Also relate vx,X,j ∈ Li to all vy,WM ,l for l ≥ j − 1 and y ∈ X. Then the proof
that N is an epistemic model proceeds as above.
We still have to show that this new pointed model is modally equivalent to
M,w. We do so in two steps. First, we observe that for every vx,Y,n in W
N
that is not the root v, and every formula ϕ of modal depth at most n2 , we have
that M,x  ϕ iff N, vx,Y,n  ϕ. The proof is basically the same as in 1). Now,
we can finally show that M,w is modally equivalent to N, v, i.e. that M,w  ϕ
iff N, v  ϕ. We do so by induction over the complexity of ϕ. We only show the
case, where ϕ is of the form Bψ. First, assume that M,w  Bψ. Thus, there
is some Y ∈ n̄(w) with M, r  ψ for all r ∈ Y . Since Y ∈ n̄(w), there is some
r ∈ X ∩ Y and some vr,Y,j in L1, such that j > 2 ·md(ψ), where md(·) denotes
the modal depth. Thus, all x ∈ R[vr,Y,j ](= {y|vr,Y,jRy}) are of the form vs,Z,m
for some s ∈ Y and m ≥ j − 1. By the previous argument, these worlds all
satisfy that N, vs,Z,m  ψ. Thus N, v  〈K〉Kψ = Bψ.
Now, assume M,w 6 Bψ. Thus, M,w  〈B〉¬ψ. We thus have to show, that
both R[v] and every R[z] for z ∈ L1 have a non-empty intersection with ‖¬ψ‖.
First, we show this for the element R[v]. Since M,w 6 Bψ, there is some r ∈ X
with M, r  ¬ψ. By construction, there is thus some vr,WM ,j in L1 with j >
2 ·md(ψ). By the previous argument, we then have that N, vr,Y,j  ¬ψ, showing
that N, v 6 Kψ. We now show that all R[z] for z in L1 have a non-empty
intersection with ‖¬ψ‖. Each such z is labelled by vy,Y,l for some Y ∈ n(w).
Again, since M,w  〈B〉¬ψ, there is some r ∈ Y such that M, r  ¬ψ. By
construction, there is a world vr,WM ,j in L2 with j > 2md(ψ) and zRvr,WM ,j .
Again by the previous argument, N, vz,WM ,j  ¬ψ. Therefore N, z 6 Kψ thus
N, v 6 〈K〉Kψ finishing the proof.
Before proceding to the proof of Theorem 1, we illustrate the construction in
the first part of the above lemma with an example.
Example 1. Let the MUD∞ neighborhood model M = 〈W,n, V 〉 be given by
the set of worlds W = {a, b, c}, the valuation V (p) = {a}, V (q) = {b} and
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Figure 4: The first four layers L0, . . . , L3 constructed in Example 1.
V (r) = {c} and the neighborhood function n:
n(a) ={{b, c}, {a, b, c}}
n(b) ={{a, b}, {b, c}, {a, b, c}}
n(c) ={{a, b}, {a, b, c}}
First, we note that for all x ∈W holds
n̄(x) = n(x) = n1(x) = n2(x) = . . .
In particular, all Bi> for i ∈ ω are valid on M . By the first part of Lemma
2, there is a KT.2 model N, v such that M, b and N, v agree on all formula
up to modal depth, say, 5. Figure 4 shows the first four levels L0, . . . , L3 of
such a N, v, constructed as in the proof of Lemma 2, part 1). For the initial
level, we start with the choice vb,{a,b} as the unique world in L0. The valuation
on L0, . . . , L3 is given by V (p) = {va,X |X ⊆ W}, V (q) = {vb,X |X ⊆ W} and
V (r) = {vc,X |X ⊆W}.
Now, we can finally prove the soundness and completeness theorem
Proof of Theorem 1. Soundness was shown in Observation 9 and Corollary 1
above. Now, we show the completeness of our axioms. Let ϕ be a belief formula
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that is valid on all epistemic frames. We have to show that `MUD+X ϕ. Assume
the contrary, i.e. 6`MUD+X ϕ and therefore by Lemma 1 there is a MUD∞ model
M on which ϕ is not valid. Thus, there is some w with M,w  ¬ϕ. By Lemma 2,
there is then an epistemic model N, v with N, v  ¬ϕ. But this contradicts the
assumption that ϕ is valid on the class of epistemic frames.
As already alluded to at the end of Section 2.1, a slight variation of the
previous construction shows, that the axioms NEC, REG and D are sound and
complete with respect to the first-order fragment of the belief language.
Remark 1. Let ϕ ∈ LB of modal depth at most 1. Then `NEC,REG,D ϕ iff
`KT.2+EQ ϕ.
Proof. Soundness, i.e. the left-to-right direction, was shown in Observation
9. For completeness, i.e. the right-to-left direction, it suffices to show that
whenever there is a MUD model M,x with M,x  ϕ, there is also an epistemic
model N, v  ϕ. Starting with a MUD model M,x, we construct N, v similar to
the last proof. The set of worlds of N will again consist of layers L0, . . . L3 and
each v ∈ WN will be labelled with a pair x,X with x ∈ WM and X ⊆ WM .
The first and last layers L0 and L3 consist of a singleton with label vw,WM .
The second layer, L2, consists of a world vv,WM for every v ∈ W . Finally, to
construct layer L1, add a world vv,WM for every v ∈W . Furthermore, for every
X ∈ n(w) pick some x ∈ X and add a world with label vx,X . Define the relation
R such that vRv for every v ∈ WN . Additionally, the unique world in L0 is
related to every element of L1 and every element of L2 is related to the unique
element of L3. Finally, an element vx,X of L1 is related to vy,Y ∈ L2 iff y ∈ X.
Defining the valuation again as vx,X ∈ V N (p)⇔ x ∈ VM (p), we find that N is
an epistemic model and N, v  ϕ, where v is the unique element of L0.
2.3 Beyond MUD: Model theory
We now take a closer look at the model theory of KT. 2 + EQ, and in particular
at its relationship to epistemic models. To start with, we relate epistemic models
to MUD neighborhood models.
Definition 4. Let M = 〈W,R, V 〉 be an epistemic model. The corresponding
belief model M ′ = 〈W ′, n, V ′〉 is defined as W ′ = W,V ′ = V and X ∈ n(w)
iff there is v ∈W with wRv such that X ⊇ {z|vRz}.
The construction of the belief neighborhoods is the semantic counterpart of
the syntactic (EQ) definition of belief as Bϕ↔ 〈K〉Kϕ. It immediately follows
that
Observation 12. For an epistemic model M,w and all ϕ ∈ LB:
M,w  ϕ⇔M ′, w  ϕ
Thus, every epistemic model, representing the knowledge and uncertainty of
an agent, can be translated into a corresponding neighborhood model, picturing
the beliefs of that same agent. But what about the converse: Given an MUD
neighborhood model M,w in which all Bi> are valid, can we retrieve the agent’s
knowledge? Or, if not, can we at least find some epistemic model N such that
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M is (equivalent to) the derived epistemic model of N? As it turns out, the
answer to both these questions is negative. In the remainder of this section we
will show why.
First, we need to define when two models are equivalent. As usual, we will
spell this out in terms of bisimulations. For neighborhood models, these are
defined as follows (cf. [16]).
Definition 5. Let M and N be monotonic neighborhood models and Z ⊆M×N
a relation. Then Z is a bisimulation iff, whenever wZv:
• (Atomic Harmony) For each p ∈ At holds w ∈ VM (p)⇔ v ∈ V N (p)
• (Zig) For all X ∈ n(w) there is some X ′ ∈ n(v) with ∀x′ ∈ X ′∃x ∈ X
such that xZx′.
• (Zag) For all X ′ ∈ n(v) there is some X ∈ n(w) with ∀x ∈ X∃x′ ∈ X ′
such that xZx′.
We call Z bitotal iff for every x ∈ M there is some y ∈ N with xZy and vice
versa.
We recall that bisimilarity is, in general, a stricter notion than logical equiv-
alence. In the case of Kripke frames, bisimilar models are logically equivalent,
but the converse need not hold, see [3, p.69]. The same holds true for neighbor-
hood models, see [16]. The question we ask here is: Is every pointed MUD∞
model M,w bisimilar to a derived neighborhood model N ′, v of an epistemic
model?
We start by giving a sufficient condition for when a pointed MUD∞ model
M,w is bitotally bisimilar to the derived model N ′, v of an epistemic model.
To do so, we extend the sequence of neighborhoods ni defined in the proof of
Lemma 2 transfinitely. Recall, that3
n0(w) :=n(w)
ni+1(w) :={X ∈ ni(w) | ∀Y ∈ n̄(w)∃r ∈ X ∩ Y : Y ∈ ni(r)}
Since the ni form a decreasing sequence (i.e. n(w) ⊇ n1(w) ⊇ n2(w) . . .), a





We can continue this construction arbitrarily, thus getting nα(w) for every or-
dinal α. Since the nα(w) form a ⊆-decreasing sequence, they must eventu-
ally reach a fixed point. Hence, there is some minimal ordinal α0 such that
nα0(w) = nα0+1(w) for all w ∈ W . This nα0 will help define the necessary and
sufficient condition for the existence of a bitotal bisimulation between M,w and
the derived model N ′, v of some epistemic model N, v. In the proof of Lemma 2,
3Note that through referring to n̄(w), rather than n(w), the construction of the ni(w)
does depend upon the valuation V . In particular, there is no straightforward lifting of the
construction in Lemma 2 from models to frames. We are not aware of any viable definition of
MUD∞ neighborhood frames, i.e. neighborhood frames that result in a MUD∞ model when
equipped with any valuation.
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we showed that the ni(w) interpret the Biϕ, i.e. M,w  Biϕ ⇔ ‖ϕ‖ ∈ ni(w).
For a MUD∞ model M , we thus have ni(w) 6= ∅ for all i < ω. The conditions
of the following theorem are even stronger than this.
Theorem 2. Let M,w be a pointed MUD∞ model. Then M,w is bitotally
bisimilar to the derived model N ′, v of an epistemic model if and only if nα0(w′) 6=
∅ for all w′ ∈M
Proof. We start by showing that nα0(w′) 6= ∅ for all w′ ∈M is a sufficient con-
dition for being bitotally bisimilar to some derived model N ′, v of an epistemic
model. Assume that nα0(w′) 6= ∅ for all w′. Then we can create an epistemic
model N, v, using a similar construction as in the proof of Lemma 2 (1). This
time, there are infinitely many levels L0, L1, . . . and instead of picking the vx,X
such that X ∈ ni(x), we pick them such that X ∈ nα0(x). Then, the relation Z
defined by xZvy,Y iff x = y is a bitotal bisimulation.
We now show that nα0(w′) 6= ∅ is also a necessary condition for being bitotally
bisimilar to some derived model N ′, v of an epistemic model. We proceed in
two steps. First, we show that in every KT. 2 + EQ model N , all nα0(w) are
non-empty. In fact, R[v] ∈ nα0(w), where R is the relation corresponding to the
K operator. As a second step, we show that if Z is a bisimulation between belief
models M and N , then it is also a bisimulation between the belief models M i
and N i, where the neighborhood functions nM and nN have been replaced by
niM and n
i
N , respectively. In particular, if xZy then n
i




We start with the first step. Let N ′, v be the derived model of an epistemic
frame. We show by transfinite induction that
R[w] = {v | wRv} ∈ nα(w)
for all ordinals α (where R is the accessibility relation of the epistemic frame
N). For n0(w) = n(w), this holds true since R is reflexive. Now, assume
α = β + 1 is a successor ordinal and R[v] ∈ nβ(v) for all v. We have to show
that R[v] ∈ nα(v) for all v. Thus, we have to show that for all Y ∈ n̄(v), there
is some r ∈ Y ∩ R[v] with Y ∈ nβ(r). Let such Y be given. By construction
of the derived model, there is some s with vRs and R[s] ⊆ Y . In particular,
s ∈ Y ∩ R[v] and, by assumption, R[s] ∈ nβ(s). Since the nβ are monotonous,




i(w). By induction, all these ni(w) contain R[w], thus
nα does too.
Finally, as a second step, we show that if Z is a bisimulation between belief
models M and N , then it is also a bisimulation between the belief models Mα
and Nα, i.e. the models M and N where the neighborhood functions nM and nN
are replaced by nαM and n
α
N . We do so by induction over α. Since n
0(w) = n(w),
the base case is trivial. Now, assume that α = β + 1 and that Z is a bitotal
bisimulation between Mβ and Nβ . We have to show that Z is a bisimulation
between Mα and Nα. The atomic harmony condition is trivial. We only show
the (zig) condition. The proof of (zag) is similar. Thus let wZv and X ∈ nα(w).
To prove (zig), it is sufficient to show that Z[X] = {v′|xZv′ for some x ∈ X} is
in nα(v). Note that by induction assumption, Z[X] ∈ nβ(v). So let Y ′ ∈ n̄(v).
We have to show that there is some r′ ∈ Z[X] ∩ Y ′ with Y ′ ∈ nβ(r′). By
definition of n̄, there is some ‖ϕ‖ ∈ n̄(v) with ‖ϕ‖ ⊆ Y ′. Thus we can assume
19
without loss of generality that Y ′ is of the form ‖ϕ‖. Since wZv, there is some
Y ∈ n(w) such that for all y ∈ Y there is y′ ∈ Y ′ with yZy′. Since Z is a
bisimulation, M,y  ϕ for every y ∈ Y . Thus Y ⊆ ‖ϕ‖. In fact, since Z is
bitotal, every y ∈ ‖ϕ‖M has some y′ with yZy′. Using monotonicity, we can
thus assume that Y = ‖ϕ‖ ∈ n̄(w). Since X ∈ nα(w), there is some r ∈ X ∩ Y
with Y ∈ nβ(r). Since Z is bitotal, there is some r′ with rZr′. Since Z is a
bisimulation, we get r′ ∈ Y ′ ∩ Z[X]. The only thing that remains to show is
that Y ′ ∈ nβ(r′). By assumption, Z is a bitotal bisimulation between Mβ and
Nβ . Since Y ∈ nβ(r), there is some Y ′′ ∈ nβ(r′) such that for all z′′ ∈ Y ′′ there
is z ∈ Y with zZz′′. Thus, since Z is a bisimulation, Y ′′ ⊆ ‖ϕ‖ and thus by
monotonicity Y ′ = ‖ϕ‖ ∈ nβ(r′). Finally, we show the claim for the case of α
is a limit ordinal. Assume that X ∈ nαM (w). Again, it suffices to show that
Z[X] = {v′|xZv′ for some x ∈ X} ∈ nαN (v). Assume not. Then there is some
β < α with X 6∈ nβN (v). Thus, since n
β
N is upward closed, there is no Z ∈ n
β
N (v)
such that for all z ∈ Z ∃x ∈ X with xZz. But this, together with the fact that
X ∈ nβM (w) (since n
β
M (w) ⊇ nαm(w)), contradicts the induction assumption that
Z is a bisimulation between Mβ and Nβ .
As mentioned above, the condition that all Bi> are valid in a MUD model
M is equivalent to stating that ni(w) 6= ∅ for all i ∈ ω. For infinite models,
this condition is weaker than demanding that nα0(w) 6= ∅. Since the former
condition guarantees that M is modally equivalent to a KT.2 model (by Lemma
2 (2)), we conjecture:
Conjecture 1. There is an infinite pointed MUD∞ model M,w, that is modally
equivalent to some KT.2 model, but not bitotally bisimilar to the derived model
N ′, v of any epistemic model.
Finally, we end with a quick note on the relationship between knowledge and
belief. Within KT. 2 + EQ logic, belief is defined through knowledge via the
equivalence (EQ): Bϕ↔ 〈K〉Kϕ. Thus, given an epistemic frame, we can read
off the agents beliefs. But what about the converse? Assume we are given the
corresponding derived belief model N ′, v of an epistemic model N, v. Can we
retrieve the agents knowledge from N ′, v? As it turns out, the answer to this is
again negative:
Example 2. There are two epistemic models M,v and N, x such that the de-
rived belief models M ′, v and N ′, x are bisimilar, while there is some formula
Kψ with M,v  Kψ and N, x  ¬Kψ.
Proof. Let the neighborhood model O have as set of worlds WO = {w1, w2, w3}.
The neighborhood function is constant (i.e. n(w1) = n(w2) = n(w3)) and given
by n = {{w1, w2}, {w1, w3}, {w1, w2, w3}}. Finally V (p) = {w1, w2}. It is easy
to check that α0 = 0, i.e. n(w) = n
1(w) = n2(w) . . . for all w. Thus, by Theorem
2, there is an epistemic model M,v such that the corresponding belief model
is bisimilar to O,w1. Furthermore, since {w1, w2} ∈ nα0(w), we can execute
the construction from the proof of Theorem 2 in such a way, that the unique
element of L0 is labelled with vw1,{w1,w2}. Thus, every z ∈ M with vRz is
labelled with w1 or w2, where R is the relation corresponding to the knowledge
operator. Since V (p) = {w1, w2}, this implies that M,v  Kp. Similarly, since
{w1, w3} ∈ nα0(w), we can also construct N, x bisimilar to O,w1 such that the
unique element of L0 is labelled with vw1,{w1,w3}.In this case, every z ∈ N with
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xRz is labelled with w1 or w3, and the latter label occurs at least once. Thus,
N, x 6 Kp. Since the derived belief models of M, v and N, x are both bisimilar
to O,w1, they are bisimilar to each other.
3 No Lockean interpretation for belief
Having a sound and complete analysis of its logical structure, we now turn our
attention to finding a suitable interpretation of the belief operator. Stalnaker, in
his original paper, offers an understanding of the belief operator as “subjective
certainty” on the side of the believing agent. This is in line with later prob-
abilistic and Bayesian interpretations (see [6, 7, 11]), where a KD45 theory of
belief has been linked to the notion of belief with probability4 1. In fact, KD45
is sound and complete with respect to belief with probability 1. So what about
the belief operators introduced here? Do they lend themselves to a probabilistic
interpretation? In the previous sections, we have introduced two new logics for
knowledge and belief. The first of these, S−4 logic, combines a KT.2 notion of
knowledge with the original Stalnaker axioms. In this logic, the resulting belief
operator is still KD45 (Observation 8), thus we can maintain the interpretation
of belief as probability 1 or, in Stalnaker’s words, as subjective certainty.
Observation 13. The belief part of S−4 logic is sound and complete with respect
to belief with probability 1.
The second logic we studied, combines a KT.2 knowledge operator with the
identity Bϕ ↔ 〈K〉Kϕ. As shown above, this belief operator is no longer a
KD45 operator anymore. In fact, it is not even normal, as Bϕ∧Bψ → B(ϕ∧ψ)
is not valid. Thus, the resulting belief will not be complete with respect to
belief of probability 1. One tempting interpretation of the belief operator under
consideration, motivated by the Lockean thesis [13], is in terms of sufficiently
high enough credence. That is, rather than demanding subjective certainty, a
formula should be believed if its credence is above a given threshold t > 1/2,
i.e.,
Bϕ iff p(ϕ) ≥ t > 1/2
for some given probability measure p. It is well known that such an operator
would not be closed under intersection. Moreover, such an operator would
validate all axioms and rules of the first-order part of
MUD +X
logic.
Observation 14. NEC, REG and D are sound for B interpreted as “probability
at least t”, for any t > 12 .
Proof. Take a probability measure over a σ-algebra and let it be the set X of
measurable sets that have probability > 1/2. It is immediately clear that X
satisfies NEC and REG. To see that X satisfies D, let X and Y in X . Since
p(X) and p(Y ) are strictly greater than 0.5, we have X ∩ Y 6= ∅, showing that
D holds.
4See [7] for combined knowledge-belief models with a probabilistic interpretation. There,
belief in ϕ is interpreted as the set of ϕ worlds having probability one, while knowledge of ϕ
means that all worlds in the knowledge cell are ϕ worlds
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NEC, REG and D, however, are not complete with respect to that interpre-
tation. There are MUD∞ models that cannot be equipped with a probability
measure in such a way that the belief operator respects the equivalence above.
We show in fact something stronger. Rather than focusing on a threshold of .5,
we show that for any threshold ε there is some MUD∞ model that cannot be
equipped with a probability measure in such a way that the agent only believes
propositions with probability at least ε. Even stronger still, the following ex-
ample will be such that there is some proposition of low probability, at most ε,
that the agent believes as well as some proposition of high probability, at least
(1− ε), that the agent fails to believe.
Example 3. Assume a company advertises a new position. As it happens, n
qualified candidates apply, so the company decides to make two hires. Assume
now, that our agent just learned that two people will be hired, but he has not yet
learned who. We will show that it is consistent with MUD +X to believe of each
candidate simultaneously that she will be hired. But, of course, no matter how
subjective credence is attributed to the different possible hires, some candidate
needs to receive an extremely low subjective probability. Let us fill in some
details.
The set of atomic propositions is p1, . . . pn, where pi stands for candidate i
getting hired. We assume that there are at least 2 candidates, i.e. n ≥ 2. The
model M = (W,n, V ) is then constructed as follows. The possible worlds are
W = {wi,j |1 ≤ i < j ≤ n}. For the valuation, let wi,j ∈ V (pk) if k = i or
k = j. Thus, world wi,j represents a situation in which agents i and j are
hired. Finally, the neighborhood function n is constant (i.e. the same for all
worlds) and given by the upward closure of {‖p1‖, . . . ‖pn‖}. In particular, we
have M  Bpi for all i. Our agent believes of every candidate that they will be
hired. Furthermore, M is a MUD∞ model: The neighborhoods n are obviously
monotonous and contain the unit. Since wi,j ∈ ‖pi‖ ∩ ‖pj‖, also D holds, thus
M is a MUD model. It is easy to check that ni(w) = n(w) for all i ∈ ω, thus
also Bi> hold for all i.
So what about the subjective probabilities? As only two candidates are hired,
not every ‖pi‖ can be assigned a high probability. If n is large enough, we are
guaranteed to find some ‖pi‖ that receives a low probability, no matter how we
choose to assign probabilities. To be somewhat more explicit about this argument,
assume we want to find a probability function that makes each ‖pi‖ the agent
believes as probable as possible. More specifically, we look for the probability
distribution that maximizes miniprob(‖pi‖); that is, we want to make the most
improbable proposition that the agent still believes as probable as possible. It is
not difficult to see that the probability distribution maximizing miniprob(‖pi‖)
assigns equal weight to all worlds. Since there are n(n−1)2 many worlds, this
probability distribution will assign a weight of 2n(n−1) to every world wij. All
‖pi‖ have cardinality n−1, thus they each receive a weight of 2n . Thus, in every
possible probability distribution with n candidates, there will be some i such that
‖pi‖ has a subjective probability of at most 2n . In particular, if n becomes large,
the agent will believe some proposition pi that is extremely implausible, i.e. one
to which she assigns probability at most 2n . At the same time, she will not believe
the proposition ¬pi, even though it receives a credence of at least n−2n .
The example shows that the notion of belief defined above is not sufficiently
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strong to enforce the “belief with high enough credence” interpretation. Now,
a natural question to ask is: What additional constraints on beliefs would be
required? We leave that question open for future work. Instead, we now inquire
into a suitable interpretation of the Bi operators defined in the last section.
In section 2.2 we have introduced a sequence of belief operators Biϕ, for
all natural numbers i. These satisfy Bjϕ → Biϕ for all j > i, thus imposing
increasingly strict conditions on belief as i grows. In fact, each Bjϕ is defined by
some (infinite) coherence conditions on the lower level Bi. In other words, the
lower level Bi could be seen as an internal scaffolding, giving further structure
to Bj . Notably, we have shown that Kϕ → Biϕ → Bϕ, i.e. Bi is situated
somewhere between belief simpliciter and knowledge. So, what is a reasonable
interpretation of the Bi? Could they, perhaps, allow for a more knowledge-like
interpretation? Or at least for an interpretation of belief with high probability?
No. Despite being stronger operators, the logical properties of the Bi are exactly
the same as those of the B operators. In the following we denote by LBi the
logical language, in which all B are replaced by Bi.
Fact 1. The axioms REC, NEC and D are sound and complete with respect
to the fragment of LBi consisting of formulas of modal depth at most 1.
Proof. Soundness follows from the fact that REC, NEC and D are sound for
B, together with the definition of the Bi. For the completeness part, we start
with a general observation: It is easy to check that if M,w is a neighborhood
model with constant neighborhood function, i.e. n(v) = n(w) for all v, w ∈M ,
then ni(v) = n(v) for all i and thus M,w  Biϕ ⇔ M,w  Bϕ. Now, assume
that ϕ is a first-order belief formula with 6`KT.2+EQ ϕ. Since MUD frames are
complete with respect to first-order belief formulas, there is a MUD model M,w
with M,w  ¬ϕ. Since the truth of ϕ depends only on n(w), we can assume
that M has a constant neighborhood function. But by the above observation,
this implies that M,w  ¬ϕ′, where ϕ′ is ϕ with all B replaced by Bi.
4 Conclusion: Inter-Definability and Higher-Order
Consistency
Omitting positive introspection for knowledge in Stalnaker’s system brings with
it a number of surprises for the logic of belief. On the one hand, the interac-
tion axioms in Table 2 (page 2) are strong enough to keep the logic of belief
unchanged, that is keep it to KD45, even in the absence of 4 for knowledge.
This is not true if, instead of these interaction axioms, we take the definition
of belief as the epistemic possibility of knowledge. Normality goes—belief no
longer distributes over conjunction—together with introspection, either positive
or negative. Not all introspective properties are lost, though. Agents, in that
logic, never believe the Moore sentence about themselves. They never believe
that something is the case but that they don’t believe this. We have shown in
fact that the agents are subjected to an infinite hierarchy of such anti-Moorean
coherence constraints, and that this hierarchy completely axiomatizes this new
logic of belief.
Compared to KD45, which as we saw in Section 3 is sound and complete with
respect to the “probability 1” interpretation, the non-normal modal operator
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resulting from defining belief with (EQ) when knowledge is KT.2 is harder to
interpret. In Section 3 we ruled out the Lockean reading. Could we then go
back to viewing this belief operator as a formulation of “absolute subjective
certainty” or even as the “mental component” of knowledge? The example
developed on page 22 shows that the absolute subjective certainty interpretation
fails in the strongest way possible, at least if “certainty” is in any substantial way
related to credences. The second reading goes back at least to Lenzen [14], who
showed that in a slightly stronger doxastic-epistemic system, knowledge and
belief become interdefinable; belief as the epistemic possibility of knowledge,
and knowledge as true belief:
Kϕ↔ ϕ ∧Bϕ
This equivalence fails already if knowledge is only S4. An inspection of the
proof of Observation 4, however, reveals that in Stalnaker’s system the logic
of “true belief” is at least S4.2. So in that logic belief can be seen as the
mental component of some epistemic-like attitude, although not of the primitive
knowledge operator. Unsurprisingly, though, even this weaker result fails in
KT. 2 + EQ. The logic of true belief will validate NEC, REG and, trivially, T,
but not the full K axiom nor any introspective principle. So this belief is not
the “mental component” of knowledge either, at least not of a common form of
knowledge.
The main philosophical output of this study of the belief fragment of KT. 2 + EQ
is thus to turn the emphasis onto the higher-order consistency constraints that
might bear on knowledge and belief, instead of adding yet another iteration to
the debate on introspection. Mirroring that debate, though, an obvious ques-
tion to ask is whether principles like “no belief in Moore sentence” (NBM) are
prone to paradoxical consequences in cases of vagueness. A multi-agent exten-
sion of KT. 2 + EQ or MUD +X also raises interesting questions. In contrast
to introspective properties, which most multi-agent epistemic logics assume to
be common knowledge, it seems natural to allow uncertainty regarding (NBM).
There is nothing paradoxical about believing a Moore sentence concerning some-
one else. The multi-agent perspective also raises interesting technical questions,
as notions such as common belief become more subtle both to define and to
axiomatize in the absence of full distribution under conjunction [16]. Along the
same line, an obvious next step is to develop a plausible theory of revision and
update for weaker beliefs. Here the main challenge, this time echoing [1, 15],
would be to see whether – if not in general then when – information dynamically
preserves the higher-order consistency constraints of MUD +X. All in all, then,
omitting introspection from Stalnakers original system has turned out to be a
technically rewarding enterprise, opening up interesting philosophical avenues.
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Appendix - Proof Theory for Stalnaker’s System
In this appendix we present a version of Stalnaker’s S in the setting of Display
logic; which we shall call DS. This is interesting because this system is a bimodal
logic and proof-theoretic investigations of such logics are still sparse.
Display logic has been designed by Belnap [2] to provide for a powerful syn-
tactic framework which is also a generalization of Gentzen’s sequent calculus [8].
Display logic allows for an elegant proof of cut elimination given that several
conditions hold. These conditions are usually easy to verify. For this end the
system contains not only formulas and sequents (also termed consecutions) but
also structures. Due to its richness, however, there also downsides to Display
logic, see e.g.[12]. For connections to other logical frameworks cf. [5, 17].
Wansing [19, 20] enriched Belnap’s orignial work with an intensional marker
•, in order to allows for a smooth formalization of normal modal logics within.
For our purposes we introduce two bullets, one corresponding to knowledge, •K
and one corresponding to belief, •B .
In what follows we present a concise version of DS. We start with definitions
of formulas and structures; throughout we use standard terminology as eg. in
[19].
Definition 6 (Formulas of DS). ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ→ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Kϕ | Bϕ
Definition 7 (Structures of DS). X := I | ϕ | ∗X | X ◦ Y | •K | •B
The particular system DS consists of an axiom, structural and (propositional)
logical rules, Display equivalence rules, and eventually rules for the introduction
of the modalities K and B.
A presentation of the system DS
Axiom A =⇒ A A is atomic.
Structural Rules
X =⇒ Y (I+)
I ◦X =⇒ Y
I ◦X =⇒ Y (I–)
X =⇒ Y
I =⇒ Y (Il)
X =⇒ Y
X =⇒ I (Ir)
X =⇒ Y
X ◦ Y =⇒ Z (P)
Y ◦X =⇒ Z
X ◦X =⇒ Y (C)
X =⇒ Y
X ◦ (Y ◦ Z) =⇒ U
(A)
(X ◦ Y ) ◦ Z =⇒ U








ϕ ◦ ψ =⇒ X
(∧l)
ϕ ∧ ψ =⇒ X
X =⇒ ϕ Y =⇒ ψ
(∧r)
X ◦ Y =⇒ ϕ ∧ ψ
ϕ =⇒ X ψ =⇒ Y
(∨l)
ϕ ∨ ψ =⇒ X ◦ Y
X =⇒ ϕ ◦ ψ
(∨r)
X =⇒ ϕ ∨ ψ
X =⇒ ϕ ψ =⇒ Y
(→l)
ϕ→ ψ =⇒ ∗X ◦ Y
X ◦ ϕ =⇒ ψ
(→r)
X =⇒ ϕ→ ψ
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Display Equivalence Rules (DE)
X ◦ Z =⇒ Y
X =⇒ Y ◦ ∗Z
Z =⇒ ∗X ◦ Y
X =⇒ Y
∗Y =⇒ ∗X
X =⇒ ∗ ∗ Y
X =⇒ Y ◦ Z
X ◦ ∗Z =⇒ Y
∗Y ◦X =⇒ Z
The rules for the introduction of K and B are structurally identical. So present
them using  for referring to either K or B and, do not index the intensional







Additionally we need the structural rule (I•) and the display equivalence rule
(•):




The four rules above capture the fact that both modalities K and B are normal
operators (in the technical sense). The additional logical content of Stalnaker’s
S is expressed by the following structural rules. Due to the fact that the log-
ical content is expressed by use of structural rules and applications of cut are
warranted only for formulas no new cases arise for the general cut elimination
procedure.
•BX ◦ •BY =⇒ ∗I (d)
X =⇒ ∗Y
X =⇒ •KY (t)
X =⇒ Y
X =⇒ •KY (4)
X =⇒ •K •K Y
•BX =⇒ Y (sb)•B •K X =⇒ Y
•KX =⇒ Y (kb)•BX =⇒ Y
•BX =⇒ Y (pi)•K •B X =⇒ Y
•BX =⇒ Y (ni)•B ∗ •K ∗X =⇒ Y
This completes the presentation of DS. Here are three important derivations















•B ∗ •K ∗Bϕ =⇒ ϕ
∗ •K ∗Bϕ =⇒ Bϕ
∗Bϕ =⇒ •K ∗Bϕ




Fact 2. The right counterparts of the structural rules P, C, and A are derivable.
27
Fact 3. DS ` ϕ =⇒ ϕ for all ϕ.
At the center of any Display logic is the Display theorem which is a main
ingredient for establishing the cut elimination theorem. For this end we need
two further definitions. It is not difficult to see that from these the Display
theorem follows.
Definition 8 (Positive and Negative Occurrence). An occurrence of a substruc-
ture in a given structure is called positive if it is in the scope of an even number
of ∗ (otherwise it is coined negative).
Definition 9 (Antecedent and Succedent Parts). In a sequent Y =⇒ Z an
occurrence of X is an antecedent part if it occurs positively in the antecedent
or negatively in the succedent. An occurrence that is not an antecedent part is
a succedent part.
Theorem 3 (Display theorem). Each antecedent part of X of a sequent S
can be displayed as the whole antecedent of a display-equivalent sequent X =⇒
Y . Likewise, each consequent part of a sequent can be displayed as the whole
succedent of a display-equivalent sequent.
From the Display theorem together with the conditions (listed below) a general
cut elimination result follows in a straightforward way. The conditions (C2)-
(C8) guarantee cut elimination, whereas (C1) ensures the subformula property.
Definition 10. (Belnap’s conditions (C1)-(C8))
(C1) Preservation of formulas: Each formula occurring in a premise of a rule
instance is a subformula of some formula in the conclusion (except Cut).
(C2) Shape-likeness of parameters: Congruent parameters are occurrences of
the same structure.
(C3) Non-proliferation of parameters: Each parameter is congruent to at most
one constituent in the conclusion; that is, no two constituents in the con-
clusion are congruent to each other.
(C4) Position-likeness of parameters: Congruent parameters are either all an-
tecedent or all consequent parts in their respective sequence.
(C5) Display of principal constituents: If a formula is principal constituent in
the conclusion of an inference, then it is either the entire antecedent or
the entire consequent of the conclusion.
(C6) Closure under substitution of consequent parts: Each inference rule is
closed under simultaneous substitution of arbitrary structures in conse-
quent parts for congruent parameters.
(C7) Closure under substitution of antecedent parts: Each inference rule is
closed under simultaneous substitution of arbitrary structures in antecedent
parts for congruent parameters.
(C8) Cut of matching principal constituents: If there are inferences Inf1 and
Inf2 with respective conclusions (1) X =⇒ ϕ and (2) ϕ =⇒ Y , with ϕ
principal in both inferences, then either (3) X =⇒ Y is identical to one
of (1) or (2), or there is a derivation of (3) from the premises of Inf1 and
Inf2 in which (Cut) is only used on proper subformulas of ϕ.
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The following two theorems are direct consequences of the above definition.
Theorem 4 (Cut elimination for DS). Cut is eliminable for DS.
Let us pause to note that condition (C1) does not play a role in proving the
eliminability of cut, i.e. conditions (C2) through (C8) are sufficient to prove
the general cut elimination theorem. However, if all eight conditions do hold
for a system, then it follows that the system possesses the subformula property
meaning that each provable sequent has a proof where every formula occurring
in any step of the derivation is a subformula of a formula in the conclusion.
Theorem 5 (Subformula property of DS). The display calculus DS without
(Cut) has the subformula property.
We can in fact prove that if (1) S ` ϕ then DS ` I =⇒ ϕ and furthermore
that (2) if DS ` X =⇒ Y , then D ` τ(X) → τ(Y ). Part (2) needs an explicit
treatment of the translation function τ , which is tedious but not particularly
difficult. We omit it here.
Fact 4. DS and S are deductively equivalent.
This fact gives rise to soundness and completeness:
Fact 5. DS is sound and complete with respect to the semantics of S.
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